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Bottleneck:
The Place of County Jails in California’s COVID-19
Correctional Crisis
HADAR AVIRAM* **
Abstract
This Article examines a lesser-known site of the COVID-19
pandemic: county jails. Revisiting assumptions that preceded and
followed criminal justice reform in California, particularly Brown v.
Plata and the Realignment, the Article situates jails within two
competing/complementary perspectives: a mechanistic, jurisdictional
perspective, which focuses on county administration and budgeting,
and a geographic perspective, which views jails in the context of their
neighboring communities. The prevalence of the former perspective
over the latter among both correctional administrators and criminal
justice reformers has generated unique challenges in fighting the
spread of COVID-19 in jails: paucity of, and reliability problems with,
data; weak and decentralized healthcare policy featuring a wide
variation of approaches; and serious litigation and legislation
challenges. The Article concludes with the temptation and pitfalls of
relying on the uniqueness of jails to advocate for vaccination and
other forms of relief, and instead suggests propagating a geographybased advocacy, which can benefit the correctional landscape as a
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whole.
Introduction
Even against the overall abysmal management of the novel
coronavirus (COVID-19) in the United States—as of February 14,
close to 30 million cases and more than half a million deaths—the
catastrophe wrought by the virus in correctional institutions stands out.
The COVID-19 case rate for prisoners was 5.5 times higher than the
US population case rate; when adjusted for age, mortality rates were
3.0 times higher in prisons than in the national population.1
Most of the national attention to COVID-19 in correctional
settings has been drawn to state prisons; the outbreaks in some
California prisons, notably Avenal2 and San Quentin,3 are widely
regarded as the worst outbreaks nationwide. In some of these prisons,
tragically, infection rates were so high that they reached natural herd
immunity.4 By contrast, the medical disasters playing out in the
country’s numerous county jails have received far less coverage, in
itself an important observation.
This Article sets out to correct that oversight by illuminating the
special problems and challenges faced by county jails handling
COVID-19. As I argue, the challenges of managing viral outbreaks in
jails stem from a serious policymaking problem: a mechanical
understanding of jails as jurisdictional, administrative units belonging
to the county and answering to different masters than state prisons,
rather than an organic perspective that sees them geographically
embedded within counties that also include prisons, immigration
detention facilities, and other entities. The mechanical-jurisdictional
perception of jails has plagued not only their role in mass
1

Brendan Saloner, et al., Cases and Deaths in Federal and State
Prisons, 324 JAMA 602, 602-03 (2020).
2
Kerry Klein, In California's Prison with the Worst COVID-19 Outbreak, Men Say
Their
Mental
Health
Is
Suffering,
KQED
(Oct.
23,
2020), https://www.kqed.org/news/11843335/in-californias-prison-with-the-wor.
3
Bay Area News Group, Worst Coronavirus Outbreak in U.S.: A Timeline of How
San Quentin Earned that Infamous Distinction, THE MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 4,
2020), https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/08/04/timeline-san-quentin-overtakesohio-prison-for-most-coronavirus-cases-in-u-s/.
4
See Christie Aschwanden, The False Promise of Herd Immunity, 587 NATURE 26,
27-28 (2020).
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incarceration, but also their inappropriate use as the solution for
population overflows and healthcare challenges in state prisons. In that
respect, the remedy has been as misguided as the disease. The outcome
of this misperception is the essence of the COVID-19 problem in jails:
acting as bottlenecks for population destined for prison or for the
community, they have sprouted outbreaks of their own, which are
underreported, improperly addressed, and managed in a haphazard,
decentralized fashion.
It is of historical interest that the linkage between congregate
penitentiaries and disease was initially made in the context of jails,
which preceded the emergence of modern prisons. While EighteenthCentury jails varied dramatically in ownership, management, and size,
they were generally not used as places of punishment.5 Jail residents
were a heterogenous hodgepodge, held or living there for multiple
reasons—mentally ill people, criminal defendants awaiting trial or
corporal punishment, and poor youth learning a trade—but what they
had in common was poverty, which meant that they were
malnourished and suffering from ill health prior to their incarceration.6
Conditions within these unregulated facilities were abysmal:
overcrowding was rampant, exposure to violence and victimization by
the more vulnerable residents was common due to the mixed
population, and no uniforms or food were provided, resulting in cold
and hunger. The air was stale due to lack of ventilation; the facilities
were never or seldom cleaned; and sometimes, raw sewage ran
through the facilities.7
5

Adam J. Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration
in Early Massachusetts, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1180, 1187, 1194 (1982).
6
See Ashley T. Rubin, Prison History, OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIMINOLOGY
AND
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
2
(2018),
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ashley-Rubin2/publication/330335915_History_of_the_Prison/links/5d120fe9458515c11cf649f
4/History-of-the-Prison.pdf.
7
See Ashley T. Rubin, The Prehistory of Innovation: A Longer View of Penal
Change, 20 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 192, 196-205 (2018); Ashley T. Rubin, Prisons
and Jails are Coronavirus Epicenters – But They Were Once Designed
to
Prevent
Disease
Outbreaks,
THE CONVERSATION
(Apr.
15,
2020), https://theconversation.com/prisons-and-jails-are-coronavirus-epicentersbut-they-were-once-designed-to-prevent-disease-outbreaks-136036; Hadar Aviram,
Introductory Remarks at the University of California Hastings Race and Poverty
Law Journal California Correctional Crisis: Mass Incarceration, Healthcare, and the
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As a consequence, disease ran rampant through jails. Eighteenthcentury reformer John Howard mentioned the dreadful legacy of the
Black Assize of 1577, during which “all those who were present died
within forty hours; the Lord Chief Baron, the Sheriff, and three
hundred more.”8 He also referred to several smaller outbreaks, which
had occurred between the 1730s and 1750s in various locations, such
as Taunton and Devonshire.9 In Howard’s time, foul air was thought
to be the cause of various diseases, including yellow fever and goal
fever; Howard wrote of “guarding [him]self by smelling to vinegar,
while I was in those places, and changing my apparel afterwards.”
After these visits, his clothes were “so offensive, that in a post-chaise
I could not bear the windows drawn up, and was therefore often
obliged to travel on horseback. The leaves of my memorandum book
were often so tainted that that I could not use it till after spreading it
an hour or two before the fire.” Indeed, the jailers themselves, fearing
infection, had “made excuses and did not go with me into the felons
wards.”10
The legacy of filth and disease left its impression on American
prison reformers; indeed, the next generation of prisons, such as
Walnut Street Penitentiary (opened in 1773)11 and Eastern State
Penitentiary (opened in 1829)12 were designed with the deliberate aim
to prevent the spread of disease. But as Jonathan Simon has noted,13
the transition to larger, isolated institutions, had adverse implications
COVID-19 Outbreak (Feb. 5, 2021), http://sites.uchastings.edu/journalsymposium/speakers-video/.
8
Dolly Stolze, The Curse of Rowland Jenkins and the Oxford Assize of
1577, BREWMINATE (Nov. 3, 2017), https://brewminate.com/the-curse-of-rowlandjenkins-and-the-oxford-assize-of-1577/.
9
JOHN HOWARD, THE STATE OF THE PRISONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 5, 18-19
(Eyres 1777), https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_State_of_the_Prisons_i
n_England_and/4EhNAAAAYAAJ?hl=en.
10
Id. at 13.
11
MICHAEL MERANZE, LABORATORIES OF VIRTUE: PUNISHMENT, REVOLUTION,
AND AUTHORITY IN PHILADELPHIA, 1760-1835, at 183 (Omohundro Inst. of Early
Am. Hist. and Culture and the Univ. of North Carolina Press 1996).
12
ASHLEY T. RUBIN, THE DEVIANT PRISON: PHILADELPHIA'S EASTERN STATE
PENITENTIARY AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA'S MODERN PENAL SYSTEM, 18291913, at xxiv (Cambridge Univ. Press 2021).
13
Jonathan Simon, The New Gaol: Seeing Incarceration Like a City, 664 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 280, 295 (2016).
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as to the perception of incarceration. One of them was the decreased
visibility of the incarcerated population, locked away in sterile and
distant facilities, which Simon argues led to seeing confinement “like
a state” rather than “like a city.”14 These new carceral settings
removed problems from the public eye and discouraged communityoriented solutions for overcrowding and healthcare problems. By
contrast, Simon argued, jails can furnish the necessary link with the
wider community that can facilitate a more holistic perspective on
reform.
Simon’s perspective, which hailed jails as the hopeful site of
criminal justice reform, reflected the sentiment of advocates statewide
at a unique moment in California’s correctional history: the landmark
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Plata,15 which upheld a
population reduction order by a federal three-judge panel. Healthcare
in California’s state prisons had been abysmal for decades, and the
evidence before the Plata court incontrovertibly demonstrated neglect
and incompetence at a massive scale.16 Even before the order, state
officials and the legislature were scrambling to alleviate the problem,
declared by then-Governor Schwarzenegger a state of emergency.17
The Schwarzenegger administration attempted to ameliorate the crisis
through a jurisdiction-based solution: changing some offense
categories from felonies to “wobblers”, which granted prosecutors the
discretion to charge them as misdemeanors resulting in county jail
sentences in lieu of state prison time.18 As this effort was joined by
judicial pressure to reduce the prison population, the subsequent
administration, under Governor Jerry Brown, embarked upon an
ambitious legislative project that came to be known as the “Great
Experiment”: The Criminal Justice Realignment.19 Jails, as I explain
14

Id. at 297.
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 545 (2011).
16
See JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT
DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA, 87-109 (2014).
17
Donald Specter, Everything Revolves Around Overcrowding: The State of
California's Prisons, 22 FED SENT’G REP., 194, 194-95 (The New Press 2010).
18
Hadar Aviram, The Inmate Export Business and Other Financial Adventures:
Correctional Policies for Times of Austerity, 11 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.
J. 111, 112-13 (2014).
19
Joan Petersilia, Realigning Corrections, California Style, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 8, 10 (2016).
15
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in later detail in this Article, were perceived by many of us in the
scholarship and advocacy realms as the ideal depressurizing valve for
California corrections not only because conditions in state prisons had
been so abysmal, but also because the jails’ proximity to, and shared
budget with, counties was perceived to provide strong economic
incentive to reduce correctional populations by internalizing the costs
of incarceration. This would end the accountability problem of
sentencing people at the county level to prison stints that would be
funded from state budgets, to which Franklin Zimring, Gordon
Hawkins, and later W. David Ball20, referred to as the “correctional
free lunch.”
Nevertheless, even at the time, advocates and scholars expressed
concerns that the problems in prisons could duplicate themselves in
jails. Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin’s analysis of judicial
intervention in correctional management is rife with examples of poor
jail conditions.21 Perhaps the most prophetic commentator was Margo
Schlanger, who in her seminal paper on Plata and Realignment
warned against a “hydra’s heads” problem—namely, that rather than
one landmark lawsuit against the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), advocates would end up
litigating dozens of separate lawsuits against county sheriffs about
conditions in jails.22
This Article essentially sets out to explain why, and how,
Schlanger has been proven right. In Part I, I introduce two
complementary perspectives on jails: a mechanic-jurisdictional
approach, which sees jails as unique because of their jurisdictional
position as county institutions, and an organic-geographic approach,
which perceives jails through the lens of carceral geography, as
carceral locations engaged in constant contact with other carceral
20

W. David Ball, A False Idea of Economy: Costs, Counties, and the Origins of the
California Correctional System, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 26, 2728 (2016).
21
MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 11114 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998). See also Bailey Heaps, Note, The Most Adequate
Branch: Courts as Competent Prison Reformers, 9 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. &
CIV. LIBERTIES 281 (2013).
22
Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and
Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.- C. L. L. REV. 165, 210-11 (2013).
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institutions and with their surrounding communities. I argue that these
perspectives should be seen as complementary, rather than competing,
and rely on their synthesis to explicate the porousness of the jail
membrane and thus its vulnerability to multiple problems, including
(but not limited to) viral infections and outbreaks.
Part II demonstrates the pitfalls of relying on the jurisdictional
approach and excluding the geographic one by explaining the
aftermath of Brown v. Plata and the Realignment. Specifically, I
explore the problem of the “correctional free lunch.” Many of us in the
advocacy and reform arena saw this as the main problem underpinning
incarceration: the lack of financial accountability by county
prosecutors and judges sentencing people to prison for felonies and
relying on the state to pick up the ever-rising tab. I show how
internalizing the costs of incarceration by imposing them at the county
level was an essential component of the legislative reform strategy,
and how this led to the decentralization of correctional approaches
throughout the state: the establishment of the Board of State and
Community Corrections (BSCC) as a loose supervisory structure, the
squabbles over budget allocations, and the wide variation of
correctional strategies among counties, ranging from preemptive
decarceration and diversion to the expansion and construction of
county jails.
In Part III, the chickens tragically come home to roost. Here, I
review how the characteristics of jurisdictional reform—
decentralization and variation—have imbued the COVID-19 crisis in
county facilities with a unique flavor. First, I explain the paucity and
unreliability of data at the jail level as a function of decentralization
and the lack of leadership from BSCC, and show how nonprofits,
academic institutions, news agencies, and private individuals stepped
up to fill the knowledge gap about COVID-19 in jails through exposés
and independent data collection efforts. Then, I examine the
experience of COVID-19 in California jails, showing that its main
features—overcrowding, lack of protective equipment and sanitation,
toxic approaches among staff members, and a shortage of medical
staffing, were compounded by a protective mechanism exercised by
state prisons: shutting down transfers from jails. This, in turn,
necessitated a “domino effect” of strategies, including an emergency
zero-bail initiative to depopulate the jails. I then show the uphill battle
that people incarcerated in jails have faced litigating COVID-19
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challenges in jails, focusing on the example of the Orange County
jails.
The Article concludes with the prospect of vaccinating the jail
population, complicating the picture of advocacy on behalf of people
housed in jails. I warn against overreliance on one “jail-specific”
argument for vaccination: the presumed innocence of pretrial jail
detainees. Instead, I suggest relying on arguments with a geographic
appeal: the transience of jail populations and the ease of administering
a vaccination program through the counties, and recommend a joint
strategy of jails, state prisons, federal prisons, and ICE detention
facilities, to vaccinate all incarcerated populations.
Part I: Two Perspectives on County Jails
With an annual national admission of close to 12 million people23
in more than 3,000 jails24—1 million of them in California’s25 more
than 160 facilities26--jails are an important component of the criminal
justice system. As in the majority of states,27 California’s jails are
administered at the county level; most of the state’s jails are
23

Ram Subramanian et al., Incarceration’s Front Door: The Misuse of Jails in
America,
VERA
INST.
OF
JUST.
(2015),
https://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/incarcerations-front-door-report.pdf.
24
See Todd D. Minton & Daniela Golinell, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2013 - Statistical
Tables,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.
(2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim13st.pdf.
25
Ryken Grattet et al., California’s County Jails in the Era of
Reform,
PUB.
POL’Y
INST.
OF
CAL. (2016), https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_916RGR.pdf.
26
List
of
California
county
jails,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_California_county_jails (last visited Apr. 23,
2021);
List
of
California
state
prisons,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_California_state_prisons (last visited Apr. 23,
2021);
California
Federal
Prisons,
PRISONER
RESOURCE,
https://www.prisonerresource.com/federal-prisons/california/ (last visited Apr. 22,
2021).
27
In six states—Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and
Vermont—both prisons and jails are under the jurisdiction of the state’s Department
of Corrections. See Barbara Krauth, A Review of the Jail Function within State
Unified
Corrections
Systems,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.
(1997), https://nicic.gov/sites/default/files/014024.pdf.
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administered by a single county, and a handful of jails serve multiple
counties. Most jails are located in counties in which there are also
other types of correctional institutions: state prisons, state and local
juvenile facilities, federal prisons, and ICE detention facilities.28 Until
the COVID-19 crisis, California jails spent years near or above their
total capacity of 79,093 beds. The use of release mechanisms, which
will be discussed in this Article, led to a population drop; as of January
2020, California’s jail population is 57,568. The jail population is
heterogenous: as of September 2020, 75% of it (43,148 people)
consisted of pretrial detainees.29 The remaining people in jail are a mix
of locally sentenced people for minor crimes, apprehended probation
or parole violators, and state-sentenced people serving time on the
county level to alleviate overcrowding in state prisons. Since the
passage of Proposition 47, approximately 90% of the people in
California jails are either sentenced or awaiting trial for felonies.30
The unique patterns and composition of jail populations can be
understood through two complementary frameworks: a mechanicaljurisdictional perspective, which examines their budgeting and
administration, and an organic-geographic perspective, which views
them in relation to their surrounding communities.
The Mechanical-Jurisdictional Perspective
In a recent article, Ashley Rubin and Michelle Phelps
problematize the use of the term “carceral state,” which simplistically
implies that there is a single, unified, and actor-less state responsible
28

See
Jails
and
Prisons
in
California,
L.A.
SHERIFF’S DEP’T, https://app5.lasd.org/iic/maps/Prisons-ALL-MAPS1.html (last
visited Apr. 15, 2021).
29
Sentenced and Non-Sentenced ADP, BOARD OF STATE AND COMMUNITY
CORRECTIONS
DATABASE,
https://public.tableau.com/profile/kstevens#!/vizhome/ACJROctober2013/About
(last visited Apr. 22, 2021). Nationwide, approximately two thirds of the jail
population are under pretrial detention: Natalie R. Ortiz, County Jails at a
Crossroads: An Examination of the Jail Population and Pretrial Release,
2 NAT’L ASS’N COUNTIES 5 (2015), https://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/docu
ments/County%20Jails%20at%20a%20Crossroads%20%20Full%20Report_updated.pdf.
30
BSCC DATABASE, supra note 29.
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for punishment. By contrast to this fictional entity, real-life carcerality
is characterized by fragmentation, variegation, and constant conflict
across the actors and institutions that shape penal policy and
practice.31 An obvious example of this is the basic distinction between
prisons and jails: generally speaking, the former facilities are run and
funded by the state, and the latter operate under the auspices and
budget of counties.
This distinction has several important implications. As a Vera
Institute report32 explains, the size of jail populations and the length of
time spent cycling through jails are a function of a series of decisions
made by largely autonomous system actors: the police who choose to
arrest, release, or book people into jail; prosecutors who determine
whether to charge or divert arrested persons; pretrial services program
providers who make custody and release recommendations; judges,
magistrates, or bail commissioners who decide whom to detain or
release, and under what conditions; other court actors, from attorneys
and judges to administrators, whose action or inaction can accelerate
or delay pending cases; and community corrections agencies who
choose how and when to respond to persons who violate their
conditions of supervision in the community. Release and detention
decisions may also depend on the existence of critical community
services that can provide the supports needed to keep people charged
with crimes out of custody. To these criteria we must add, especially
in California, legislative actors who engage in jurisdictional
gymnastics, such as creating new offenses or changing offense
categories, with particular carceral destinations (jails or prisons) in
mind.
The relative independence of these actors, and their diverse (and
sometimes contradictory) goals, make it difficult to align their efforts
to control the use of jails. Some of these actors may be more aware
than others of the share of jails in the county budget and take it into
account when managing jail intake and releases. Others yet may
believe that jails are inappropriate to house certain residents, such as
people serving long stretches of time for serious offenses. These
31

Ashley Rubin & Michelle Phelps, Fracturing the Penal State: State Actors and
the Role of Conflict in Penal Change, 21 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 422, 423
(2017).
32
SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 18.
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categories of people may be in need of long-term programming that
would be difficult to administer in facilities originally conceived as
temporary housing for people on trial (or even for people who are
booked for just a few days.)
As explained in a National Institute of Corrections report33, the
population dynamics of jails are a function of multiple questions:
What is the purpose of the jail, who is in the jail, how people enter and
exit it, and how long they remain at the jail. The entrance and exit
doors are jurisdictional valves: some people enter jail upon arrest,
from the community, while some enter after they are sentenced; some
people spend a few days in jail, whereas some serve years’ long
sentences there; some exit the jail directly into the community, while
some shift to other jurisdictions, through a state prison sentence, an
ICE hold, or a federal hold. The population’s heterogeneity and the
multiplicity of entrance and exit doors make predictive modeling
difficult. This is compounded by the fact that individual counties
cannot reliably plan intake and exit using aggregate data. Mass
incarceration is regarded a national problem and is analyzed at the
national or state level, but the structure of jails and their location in the
administrative hierarchy means that they are “first responders” in the
criminal process—an example of what public policy scholars have
referred to as “disjointed federalism.”34
The Organic-Geographic Perspective
By contrast to the jurisdictional perspective, an organicgeographical perspective examines the continuity between jails and
surrounding communities. Even a superficial glance at the California
map reveals that jails are embedded in cities and rural communities,
and often not that distant, geographically, from prisons and detention
33

Mark A. Cunniff, Jail Crowding: Understanding Jail Population Dynamics, U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.
(Jan.
2002),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/017209.pdf.
34
In the defense context, see Tyler Prante & Alok K. Bohara, What Determines
Homeland Security Spending? An Econometric Analysis of the Homeland Security
Grant Program, POL’Y STUD. J. 243 (2008); Erica Chenoweth & Susan E.
Clarke, All Terrorism Is Local: Resources, Nested Institutions, and Governance for
Urban Homeland Security in the American Federal System, 63 POL. RSCH. Q. 495,
495-98 (2010).
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facilities. Indeed, thinking about jails as part of a carceral continuum
should be precisely because of their multiple intersections with
various communities and facilities.
Studies in carceral geography35 have examined, for example, the
complicated political,36 economic,37 and cultural38 reasons for siting
correctional facilities at particular locations. Other studies show the
carceral aspects of localities and sites beyond ostensible carceral
spaces, such as gentrified downtown areas, statewide overnight buses,
spatial restrictions on sex offenders, gang members, and electronically
monitored homes.39
These works illuminate the carceral continuum, of which jails are
an essential part, both literally and figuratively. A bus transferring
people from jail to prison is, technically, traversing jurisdictions, but
at the same time it creates a continuum of carceral power by smoothly
35

DOMINIQUE MORAN, CARCERAL GEOGRAPHY: SPACES AND PRACTICES OF
INCARCERATION 60 (Routledge 2018).
36
RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 93–94 (U.C. Press, 2007);
Dale Sechrest, Locating Prisons: Open Versus Closed Approaches to
Siting, 38 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 88, 88 (1992); KATHLEEN SHEA ABRAMS &
WILLIAM LYONS, IMPACT OF CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES ON LAND VALUES AND
PUBLIC POLICY 2 (U.S. Dep’t of Just., 1987).
37
Susan Blankenship & Ernest Yanarella, Prison Recruitment as a Policy Tool of
Local
Economic
Development:
A
Critical
Evaluation, 7 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 183, 185 (2004); Matthew D. Vanden
Bosch, Rural Prison Siting: Problems and Promises, 1 MIDSOUTHERN J. OF CRIM. JUST. 1, 3 (2020); Tracy Huling, Building a Prison Economy
in Rural America, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
MASS IMPRISONMENT 197 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002);
Shaun Genter et al., Prisons, Jobs and Privatization: The Impact of Prisons on
Employment Growth in Rural U.S. Counties, 1997-2004, IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST
(Jan.
2013),
https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wpcontent/uploads/prisonsJobsPrivatization-SSR-2.pdf; JOHN EASON, BIG HOUSE ON
THE
PRAIRIE:
RISE
OF
THE
RURAL
GHETTO
AND
PENAL
PROLIFERATION 3 (Univ. of Chi. Press, 2017).
38
Joelle Fraser, American Seduction: Portrait of a Prison Town, 39 MICH. Q.
REV. 1, 2–3 (2000); PRISON TOWN, USA (Public Broadcasting Services 2007). For
an analogy between prison towns and cattle towns, see KAREN MORIN, CARCERAL
SPACE, PRISONERS AND ANIMALS (Routledge 2018).
39
BRETT STORY, PRISON LAND: MAPPING CARCERAL POWER ACROSS NEOLIBERAL
AMERICA (Univ. of Minn. Press 2019); THE PRISON IN TWELVE LANDSCAPES (Oh
Ratface Films 2016).
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transitioning people between geographic locations without a break in
carcerality. More figuratively, the shift from the outside world into a
jail is not as abrupt as the jurisdictional perspective suggests if one
considers the carceral elements embedded in practices such as drug
testing in workplaces,40 meting out discipline in schools,41 and
surveillance of homes42 and neighborhoods43--oft referred to through
the apt metaphor of a “pipeline.” Even technological tools operating
within the private sector, such as the use of software for predictive
policing,44 the racialization of surveillance in employment, buying,
and selling,45 limitations on financial mobility through the creation of
credit scores,46 and the employment of surveillance tactics, offered by
loss prevention corporations, to employees in the retail industry,47
serve as conduits of carceral power, creating a continuous stream
40
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between “the outside” and the jail space. Complicating the picture is
the variety of uses of the jail itself, including as an inadvertent but
increasingly vital component of the healthcare safety net.48
The importance of supplementing the jurisdictional perspective
with the geographic one cannot be overstated. If one considers jails
separately, framing the entrances and exits as valves in and out of
separate, disjointed jurisdictions that can be open and closed at will,
policymaking for one level of government may completely overlook
the other. By contrast, thinking of jails as one area in a smooth carceral
continuum requires taking them into account when planning policies
involving population control and management. As the next part shows,
the Achilles heel of the Plata/Realignment solution to the prison
healthcare crisis was that it focused exclusively on the jurisdictional
aspect.
Part II: Criminal Justice Reform through the Jurisdictional
Prism: Jails as the Solution to Prison Problems
The Correctional Free Lunch Problem and Its Solutions
Decades before the Criminal Justice Realignment relied on a
jurisdictional shift to achieve population reduction in prisons, scholars
pointed to a basic problem contributing to mass incarceration.
Elegantly referred to by Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins as the
“correctional free lunch,”49 it was essentially an argument about
economic externalities: prosecutors charge felonies, and judges
sentence people convicted of them, in county courts, whereas the
sentence itself takes place in state prisons. This means that the county
never “feels” the costs associated with the sentence, and therefore does
not take them into account when dishing out lengthy sentences.
Several solutions were proposed for the correctional free lunch
problem. Zimring and Hawkins themselves advocated for
homogenizing sentencing policies at the state level, through the work
48
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of a sentencing commission.50 Other scholars have argued that judges
should be informed of the cost of incarceration, and offered empirical
proof that, when they are informed, judges tend to sentence more
leniently.51
As the healthcare crisis in state prisons raged, another solution
emerged: shifting the responsibility of incarceration to the counties
who mete out the punishment. The Schwarzenegger Administration’s
initiative to reconfigure nonviolent felonies as “wobblers”—offenses
that can be prosecuted as felonies or as misdemeanors—were designed
to offer prosecutors the option to dictate whether the sentence would
be served in a state prison (for a felony) or in a county jail (for a
misdemeanor). But prosecutorial discretion would prove insufficient
to solve the problem of disease and neglect in prisons; The pressure to
solve this problem was augmented by the advent of the 2008 financial
crisis, which hurt state and local correctional budgets,52 and by the
growing sense that federal courts would intervene with a population
reduction order. Indeed, a federal three-judge panel heard evidence
according to which, every six days, a prisoner in California died of a
preventable, and often iatrogenic, condition.
As Margo Schlanger recounts,53 the Brown Administration’s
response to this multifaceted state prison crisis—the enactment of
A.B. 109—was for the most part a jurisdictional shift initiative. Under
the Realignment, people convicted of nonserious, nonviolent, and
nonsexual crimes (colloquially known as the “non-non-nons”) would
serve their sentences in county jails, granting sheriffs the authority to
50
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release them if necessary. In addition, most post-sentence supervision,
which used to be under the auspices of state parole authorities, shifted
to county probation offices, and parole revocations also became a
county matter.
Lest it appear that the jurisdictional shift was the product of
calculated econometrics, Schlanger convincingly explains it as a last
resort strategy: jails had 10,000 available beds at the time and, given
the population reduction order’s approval by the Supreme Court, using
them for state prisons was deemed the only palatable solution because,
as the prison’s healthcare Federal Receiver Clark Kelso explained,
"politically, nobody could tolerate a straight release of inmates prior
to serving their sentence.” County authorities “went along with this
approach, albeit reluctantly. As Orange County Sheriff Sandra
Hutchens explain[ed to Schlanger], ‘We had no choice. The State had
to deal with the three-judge panel and reduce population. The sheriffs
were given the option of working with the State on a plan, or the State
releasing tens of thousands of prisoners early, with no supervision.’”54
However, overall, reformers and advocates hailed the jurisdictional
shift as a method of deliverance from the deep failures of the state
correctional apparatus. Some of the support for Realignment came
from the perception that no healthcare provided by the counties could
possibly be worse than the dysfunctional, neglectful healthcare
nightmare of the state prison system which, at the time, had already
been under federal Receivership for five years.55
At the same time, some tried to inject econometric reason into the
chaotic funding method of the plan, whose success, after all, would
depend on the extent to which the counties would internalize the costs
of their own appetites for incarceration. Under Realignment, over $1
billion annually of state sales tax revenue, phased in over several
years, was shifted from the state to the counties, and $1.2 billion in jail
construction bonds that had been authorized in 2007 was to be
accelerated. This, as Schlanger notes, was known to be insufficient to
fund the transition even at the time; the “sweetener” of the deal was
54
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that the counties would have absolute freedom in spending the money,
which was to be awarded as a block grant. Counties could use the
money as they saw fit: invest in diversion programs and treatment to
prevent incarceration or increase jail capacity.
The problem with relying on this allocation technique as an
incarceration appetite suppressant was the allocation technique, which
relied on a formula using the number of offenders that each county
had sent to state prison, the county's adult population, and prior grant
funding. Counties that had invested in alternatives to incarceration
prior to realignment complained that they were being penalized for
their good work, while more punitive counties were rewarded for their
punitiveness with a larger share of the pie. In a series of important
papers,56 W. David Ball proposed tweaking the formula in a way that
would exercise a bit more control over the counties by incorporating a
proxy for their need to rely on incarceration: violent crime rates in
each county. Under this system, Ball proposed, “[l]ocalities would
receive funds based on reported rates of violent crime and would be
free to spend these monies on prison, diversion, jail, or anything else.
The state would continue to administer prisons but would charge
counties for every prisoner they sent.” This plan would “end the
correctional free lunch” by making the trade-offs obvious to county
officials. Counties that would retain or even increase their
incarceration rates would be free to do so, but they would have to fund
it on their own; moreover, they would face political accountability for
their choices, because “[t]he average person could more easily spot the
linkage between increasing numbers of prisoners and, say, a decrease
in the frequency of road repairs or a shorter public school year,
allowing political checks on criminal justice to operate more
effectively.” Whether this strategy would work was still unknown;
Joan Petersilia observed that, “if it [did] not work, counties [would] be
overwhelmed with diverted inmates, unable to operate needed
programs, which ultimately results in continued criminality and jail
56
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(instead of prison) crowding.”57
The Establishment of the Board of State and Community
Corrections (BSCC) and the Effort to Share County Data
As a consequence of Realignment, the state established the BSCC,
a loose resource and regulator for the counties as they were imbued
with their new responsibilities that reports directly to the Governor.
The BSCC website identifies it as an “independent statutory agency
that provides leadership to the adult and juvenile criminal justice
systems, expertise on Public Safety Realignment issues, a data and
information clearinghouse, and technical assistance on a wide range
of community corrections issues” as well as “promulgates regulations
for adult and juvenile detention facilities, conducts regular inspections
of those facilities, develops standards for the selection and training of
local corrections and probation officers, and administers significant
public safety-related grant funding.”
The idea of the BSCC as a liaison mechanism between
community stakeholders is evident in its composition. As of now, per
its website, it consists of a Chair, two CDCR officials (the Secretary
and the Director of Adult Parole Operations), two county sheriffs, two
county chief probation officers, one retired judge, one chief of police,
and three representatives of diversion and rehabilitation programs (one
position is vacant.)58
The BSCC’s role as information clearinghouse for the counties
was especially important given the decentralized nature of county
data. In 2016, at the request of the BSCC, the U.S. Justice
Department's Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Diagnostic Center
evaluated the BSCC’s data collection enterprise, resulting in the
development of a self-evaluation checklist for California counties to
follow in adhering to sound data and information-sharing principles.
The checklist consisted of four principles: using national approaches
for interagency information exchange and strategy development;
using data to support informed justice and public-safety
decisionmaking; developing responsible information-sharing policies,
57
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including by connecting existing networks and systems with strong
identity, access, and discovery capabilities; and cross-boundary
information-sharing and collaboration with input from all involved
stakeholders.59 Despite this initiative, information about jails would
continue to be disseminated primarily through the respective sheriff’s
departments, with a few notable exceptions, chief among which are
the jail profile survey (administered since the 1970s, but now under
the auspices of the BSCC)60, the jail population dashboard,61 and a few
reports on inspection of local detention facilities.62 By comparison to
the detailed population reports and annual population data conducted
by CDCR and provided on its website,63 the BSCC database is
underwhelming; specific functions, such as inmate locators, are
accessible only at the individual county level,64 and the respective
websites for the different sheriff’s departments vary widely by style,
quality, clarity, and amount of available information.65
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Admittedly, county jails differ from state prisons in that transfers
between counties are much rarer than transfers between state prisons,
which at first blush obviates the need for a centralized inmate locator
function. The problem is that transfers between jails and prisons are
extremely common; as we have seen, most of the jail population
consists of pretrial detainees, many of whom will eventually serve
state sentences. Not only does BSCC’s data dissemination quality pale
by comparison to CDCR’s, but there is virtually no interface between
the respective websites of the two agencies, which presents an
enormous obstacle to any effort to trace population movements across
the state/county jurisdictional divide.
I do not mean to argue that BSCC has been entirely ineffectual.
The agency has processed grants for county programs and offered
supervision of county facilities.66 What is important to stress,
however, is that this has taken the form of information and advice,
rather than centralized control—and, more importantly, that despite
the appointment of two top CDCR officials to BSCC, the latter does
not offer stakeholders—families of incarcerated people, advocates,
lawyers, scholars, the general public—a true understanding of the way
people move, in real life, between facilities. This evinces a bias toward
the mechanic-jurisdictional understanding of counties and states as
separate realms, rather than for the organic-geographic understanding
that, for real people in real time and space, these facilities are located
on a continuum of movement on both the individual and the aggregate
levels.
The only effort to systematically harmonize state- and countylevel data in California is the Multi-County Study (MSC), a joint
venture between the BSCC and the Public Policy Institute of
California (PPIC). Unfortunately, the only participating counties are
Alameda, Contra Costa, Fresno, Humboldt, Kern, Los Angeles,
Orange, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Francisco, Shasta, and
66
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Stanislaus—a problem somewhat mitigated by the fact that the
aggregate population of these jails is two-thirds of the state’s jail
population.67 The next section shows how important this data
collection effort has been to understand how counties responded to the
jurisdictional population shifts.
Jail Conditions in the Post-Plata Decade and the Prospect of the
Hydra Problem
When Schlanger wrote about Realigment, shortly after its
enactment, she found “deep dissensus among observers about the
prospects for nonincarcerative county responses,” with some
commentators labeling the incentive structure “a liberal fantasy” and
others welcoming the need to implement uncomfortable change. One
of Schlanger’s interviewees, sheriff’s lobbyist Nick Warner, was
remarkably prophetic: he observed that, in some counties, there were
"a lot of good things going on," while in others, he predicted, "we'll
have overcrowded local jails, and people will sue the pants off us."68
Schlanger referred to the possible result of such variation, and
resulting healthcare failures at the county level, as a “potential hydra
problem,” after the famous mythological creature who, whenever her
head would be cut off, would sprout two heads in its place. The
concern was that incarcerated people and their lawyers, rather than
filing one lawsuit against the entire state apparatus, would find
themselves fighting multiple legal battles against various county jails.
Indeed, as PPIC researchers found through the MSC data in 2015,
realignment alone did not result in a concerted decarceration effort at
the county level.69 The immediate effect of realignment was a
simultaneous population decline in state prisons and population
increase in county jails. The jail population continued to rise at a
steady pace until the November 2014 passage of Proposition 47, which
reclassified several drug and property offenses as misdemeanors.
67
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Proposition 47 had a salutary effect on both state and county facilities.
At the state level, in combination with building and renting additional
prison beds, it helped CDCR finally reach the population reduction
target required by Brown v. Plata. As shown in Figure 1, at the county
level, the passage of Proposition 47 resulted in an almost immediate
population reduction, from 82,000 in October to 72,000 in November,
bringing the jail population back under the statewide rated capacity of
nearly 80,000 beds. This also resulted in 20% fewer releases due to
housing constraints.
Figure 1: Adult Jail Population and Capacity Releases in California
County Jails, 2010-2014

Source: Public Policy Institute of California
PPIC researchers expressed concerns that the relief for jail
populations was temporary; data through March 2015 for Los Angeles
County, for example, showed that the jail population dipped below
16,000 in December (down from more than 18,000 in October), but
rose above 17,000 in January and stayed above 17,000 through March.
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But a retrospective view of the aggregate population changes on the
BSCC population dashboard reveals that, generally speaking, Prop
47’s effect was salutary and lasting. Figure 2 depicts jail population
and releases due to housing constraints since the passage of Prop. 47,
showing consistent bookings close to (but below) the aggregate
capacity of county facilities, and a more-or-less consistent rate of
releases to ensure an acceptable level of crowding.
Figure 2: Average Daily Population, Rated Capacity, and Bookings
in California County Jails, 2015-2021

Source: BSCC Jail Population Dashboard
It is important to point out that the trends reviewed above were
observable on the aggregate level. On the individual jail level, counties
dramatically differed in terms of their reliance on incarceration versus
noncustodial alternatives. A comparative study of twelve counties
conducted by RAND researchers in 2015 found considerable variation
in policies, practices, jail admissions, and jail release patterns.70 In San
Francisco and Stanislaus counties, jail populations did not rise after
Realignment. Fresno, Kern, Los Angeles, Riverside, Sacramento, San
70
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Bernardino, San Diego, and Stanislaus counties were using early
releases, and each had one or more facilities under a court-ordered
population cap. Some of these counties had been using early releases
and noncustodial alternatives before realignment to manage their
populations. In interviews conducted by the researchers, different
stakeholders expressed different concerns: while probation officers
thought that their counties balanced incarceration and rehabilitation,
sheriff’s departments expressed strong concerns about jail crowding
and the need to cope with people serving long sentences in county
facilities by providing programming that was previously unnecessary.
In some of these counties, such as Los Angeles and San Francisco,
struggles erupted between county officials and local activists
regarding plans to build new facilities or expand old ones to
accommodate newcomers.
This new landscape in county jails would confirm Schlanger’s
concerns about the hydra problem even prior to the COVID-19 crisis.
In addition to the aforementioned court-mandated population caps in
several California counties, which preceded Realignment, Schlanger
(who wrote her article in 2013) mentioned the filing of the Prison Law
Office’s first jail case, in Fresno, and the expansion of the ACLU of
Southern California’s work on conditions in Los Angeles county jails.
She also observed that some ongoing prison litigation, such as
Armstrong and Valdivia, would encompass supervision of
proceedings in jails as well.
I provided this lengthy pre-COVID-19 account of county jails to
foreshadow the havoc that the pandemic would wreak on these
facilities and, more specifically, the systemic weaknesses and
oversights that would be revealed during the pandemic crisis. As we
have seen, the remedy for the prison healthcare crisis exhibited the
same shortsightedness as the cure: the notion that prisons and jails are
separate, distinct entities, disjointed because of their differing
jurisdictional statuses, and that jails could therefore be used as a
depressurizing valve for problems in prisons without much regard to
how these solutions would impact the jails themselves. The
decentralization of jails, the paucity of centralized information of high
quality, and the absence of systematic interface between the prison and
jail data systems, would obscure important interactions between the
facilities. Any efforts to help the jail’s heterogenous, transient
population, through political advocacy or through legislation, would
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struggle in the absence of data, and would face challenges in securing
counsel and providing timely relief. Most importantly, the COVID-19
crisis in prisons would exacerbate the crisis in jails, this time using the
depressurizing valve to prevent intake, and pushing the jails to fend
for themselves.
Part III: The Chickens Come Home to Roost: COVID-19 and the
Failure of the Jurisdictional Approach
Agnotology: The Paucity of Jail-Level Data as a Social Fact
Agnotology, a term coined by Robert Proctor and Iain Boal,71 is
the study of culturally induced ignorance or doubt, particularly the
publication of inaccurate or misleading scientific data. In
epistemological areas such as climate change72 and vaccination,73
attention to agnotology can reveal the political and cultural roots of
mistaken opinions or information gaps and develop educational and
persuasive countermeasures.
Agnotology plays an important role in understanding the
production of knowledge (or lack thereof) about criminal justice and
correctional topics. The prevalence of myths about racial crime rates74
and sex crimes75 is well documented in the literature. But agnotology
also examines glaring information gaps, treating them not as
coincidental but as social facts that are important in themselves. For
example, in his book When Police Kill76 Franklin Zimring devotes
71
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considerable attention to the incompleteness of governmental statistics
on incidents in which police officers exercised lethal force, comparing
them unfavorably to journalistic tallies of such incidents. Similarly, in
her book American Roulette,77 Sarah Beth Kaufman discusses the
sociological meaning of a lack of any centralized database containing
information about capital trials.
Any discussion of the COVID-19 crisis in jails must begin with
the epistemological question: what do we know about the crisis? What
do we not know? And how do we know what we know? As I explained
in Part II, obtaining complete data in a usable format has always been
a challenge with county jails, and BSCC’s efforts to centralize data
collection resulted in a sparse, user-unfriendly database that did not
interface with CDCR’s database. The COVID-19 contagion was no
exception.
For almost five months, there was no official, centralized data
collection project on COVID-19 in county jails. CDCR began
collecting data on the spread of COVID-19 at its institutions—state
prisons-- on March 1078; even though the tool evinced some delays in
reporting deaths and some unclarity as to the categories it used, it at
least provided information on cumulative and active cases, deaths, and
testing rates. No equivalent tool tracked cases in counties. For months,
there was great variation in the amount and type of information
reported by the counties, as well as the format in which it was offered.
Some sheriff’s departments offered a webpage with their COVID-19
readiness protocols (such as the cancelation of visitation.) Others
reported only on active cases.
Advocates and public health experts had warned, early in the
course of the pandemic spread, that jails posed a bigger infection and
transmissivity risk than prisons, due to the transience of their
populations. At public meetings in which activists demanded statistics
about COVID-19 spread in jails, BSCC leadership waffled about
centralized data collection efforts; Linda Penner, the board’s chair,
said this was an “unprecedented time” and that teams were being as
responsive as possible helping; but that collecting and publishing data
about county jail disease outbreaks would not be a priority. The
Sacramento Bee quoted Penner as saying, “We don’t want to sound
77
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like bureaucrats, but we also have to be well aware of the magnitude
of this across the state and the various other reporting requirements
locals have. We try to balance that conundrum right now.”79
In the absence of centralized data collection, the task of informing
the public about serious county jail outbreaks—several of which
occurred during the spring of 2020—was almost exclusively
performed by newspaper exposés. On April 27, the Los Angeles Times
reported of the untimely death of 52-year-old Riverside County’s
deputy Sheriff Terell Young, who “for two weeks in early March. . .
routinely drove inmates, one at a time. . . to a hospital for medical
appointments” and was exposed, during those trips, “to several people,
including inmates and a nurse, who would later test positive for the
coronavirus infection.”80 As of late April, the jail reported 136 cases
and two deaths—one of a jail resident and one of another deputy. The
article compared the sheriff’s rebuke of jail releases as an essential
emergency measure by comparing it to a serious outbreak at the Los
Angeles jail complex (whose population numbered 11,866 at the
time); by late April, 71 jail resident and 61 staff members had tested
positive, and a nurse had died.81 In June, the Sacramento Bee reported
that Fresno County Jail had quarantined 1200 residents, after 13 who
had been transferred to a state prison tested positive. In Sacramento
County, five jail residents tested positive for COVID-19—information
that took the Bee 10 days to obtain from the Sheriff’s office. Officials
were also slow to report of an outbreak at the jail in Auburn, Placer
County, where 17 residents and a correctional officer tested positive.
The newspaper noted that none of those three counties regularly
posted information about COVID-19 in their facilities. In the face of
county sheriffs’ resistance to release the data, BSCC’s position was,
again, astonishingly laissez-faire: BSCC Chair Linda Penner
mentioned that she was having conversations about data tracking, but
that the board’s hands were largely tied and it was on local health and
jail officials to decide how much information to share. She expressed
79
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concerns that “if [the data reporting was to be done] based on selfreporting COVID cases to us jail by jail, I think there’s a concern that
there would be issues with accuracy.”82
By mid-July, the paucity of data became a serious problem, and
Penner finally wrote a memorandum to all county sheriffs, informing
them that a centralized data collection effort would be underway, and
that their assistance would be necessary.83 The letter required the
sheriffs to report “the number of new positive COVID-19 tests for
both residents and staff (reported separately), and deaths at each
facility each week. We will also make a one-time request for your
facilities’ cumulative COVID-19 case information and deaths to date”.
In addition, Penner requested that each sheriff’s department ensure
that “your facility health care providers are immediately reporting
detailed case-level COVID-19 data to your county public health
COVID-19 Data Dashboard Page 2 agency. Every facility
administrator should work with their health care providers to ensure
that data are being reported timely and completely to your county
public health department.”
The resulting database, which went live in late July, was
disappointingly sparse and unwieldy.84 Not only was the data
presented per individual facility, with no analysis or aggregate data
functions, but it was bound to allow outbreaks to occur undetected;
per Penner’s request to the sheriffs, any number of infections below
11 would be reported and displayed as “<11”, with no information as
to testing rates. Needless to say, the database did not interface at all
with CDCR’s tracking tool, making it impossible to contact-trace
across the jurisdictional divide.
But even after the BSCC data collection effort, massive outbreaks
continued to occur undetected. On August 27, 2020, KQED journalists
reported on a massive outbreak at the Fresno County Jail—at least
82
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1,115 inmates and 76 employees had tested positive, 21 of whom had
been hospitalized—and sought an explanation from the California
Department of Public Health (CDPH). The Department’s
spokesperson replied that CDPH collected information on jails from
county health officials but did not publish it because it was often
“incomplete”; the spokesperson attributed the data quality problem to
the high volume of cases and inadequate resources for counties to
report them.85
In the absence of useful data through official channels, other
actors stepped in to fill the gaps. Launched on March 24 by Sharon
Dolovich and Aaron Littman,86 UCLA’s COVID-19 Behind Bars Data
Project87 began collecting data on a national level, including federal,
state, and local facilities. The project has been tracking infection rates,
hospitalization, deaths, recoveries, transfers, testing, etc., for all
correctional institutions, but found it difficult to obtain data on jails.
On its webpage, the Project explains that data collection depends on
data quality and availability, as “correctional authorities vary
dramatically in what they report publicly” and “[t]here have been
instances when the values reported by an agency changed over time in
ways that were unexpected based on the description of the variable.”
The variation in reporting quality poses special difficulty in the
context of testing, which “vary widely by correctional agency. As a
result, true case counts are likely higher than reported, and the extent
of this underdetection is extremely variable.” Another area of concern
is the lack of reliable reporting on staff infections, as “[s]ome
jurisdictions leave it to staff members’ discretion whether to report
positive test results they receive from community healthcare
providers. As a result, the number of staff cases reported may be lower
even than the number detected by testing.”88
A glance at the Project’s California page reveals that, even as of
85
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February 28, 2021, they do not have reliable data for several California
jails. The Project does not rely on the BSCC database for its numbers;
instead, it scrubs data from the more informative databases for the
individual sheriff’s departments, and relies on external, reliable
sources for the rest.89
One such resource is a regional collection effort by the Davis
Vanguard, which includes an accessible database covering several
counties.90 The Davis Vanguard relies on the websites maintained by
the Sheriff’s departments in Alameda, San Francisco, Solano, Yolo,
Los Angeles, Orange, Santa Clara, and Sacramento counties; the
Vanguard also reports BSCC numbers, but state that the BSCC
database “remains incomplete as many facilities have refused to
comply. Further, it does not contain historical data prior to July 20.”91
Importantly, the Vanguard’s reporting includes information about
quarantines of specific units in some of the jails, as well as about
testing rates where available.
Notably, these academic and journalistic efforts are supplemented
by efforts by private individuals who pore over data from specific jails.
For example, UC Berkeley law student Darby Aono maintains her
own database of the Santa Rita jail which, in addition to population,
case numbers, and testing rates, includes information on quarantines
by housing unit.92
That a serious, rigorous actor such as the UCLA COVID-19 Data
Project prefers to avail itself of these alternative sources, rather than
of the incomplete BSCC data, is an important social fact. It brings to
mind Franklin Zimring’s aforementioned effort93 to quantify lethal
force exercised by law enforcement. Zimring compared the FBI
database to those maintained by the Washington Post and the
Guardian, finding that the official statistics left out about half of the
89
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lethal incidents, and relying for his analysis and recommendations on
the journalistic databases. Such data collection gaps by governmental
agencies are not unimportant: handling complicated, tragic
phenomena requires careful study of its extent and distribution, and
neglect in this area can cast doubt on the seriousness that is ascribed
to these tragedies and the efficacy of the efforts to prevent and address
them—as we see in the next section.
The COVID-19 Experience in County Jails
Even before the pandemic, multiple experts and officials urged
correctional authorities at all levels to reduce their populations and
adopt measures to prevent the spread of disease. In early March, when
San Francisco saw only 13 cases, San Francisco Public Defender
Mano Raju sent a letter to San Francisco Sheriff Paul Miyamoto,
expressing his “serious concern” that the more than 1,100 inmates
living together in San Francisco’s jails could be susceptible to the
contagious disease. Raju warned Miyamoto about the specific risks to
the pretrial detainee population, writing: “The constant flow of both
staff and detainees in an out of the jails — where large numbers of
people are housed in close proximity — means that a powerful virus
like COVID-19 can take over quickly and easily.”94
Jails differed greatly in the precautionary steps they took. In early
March, the Sacramento Bee reported that the Merced County Sheriff’s
Office announced that it would halt visitation at two county facilities
as a temporary, “precautionary measure”, and started conducting
visitor screenings; by contrast, a Fresno County Sheriff’s Office
spokesman said the agency had no plans to halt visitation and was
“constantly educating inmates, staff and visitors about the importance
of good hygiene.” Sacramento County reported it had not changed
anything about its daily operations, intake screening, jail visitation or
communicable disease practices because they were already
“sufficient.” Placer County, where a cruise ship passenger had died on
March 4, said it would not answer basic questions regarding its jail
94
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policies without a formal request under California’s Public Records
Act.95 Remarkably, in late March, the San Francisco Chronicle
reported that Solano County sheriff’s deputies were driving to other
county jails and picking up recently freed people on minor traffic
offenses, then transporting them to their own jail.96
This variation, as well as the difficulties of coordinating a
response to the closure of prisons to jail transfers, were at the root of
the COVID-19 problem in jails. On March 24, in an effort to curb the
contagion in state prisons, Governor Newsom issued an executive
order directing the CDCR Secretary to temporarily halt the intake
and/or transfer of inmates and youth into the state’s 35 prisons and
four youth correctional facilities.97 The stoppage of jail intakes did not
completely eliminate the risk to state prison residents; indeed,
transfers between facilities continued, resulting in several cases—
notably, the infamous outbreak at San Quentin prison—from botched
transfers from other state prisons.98
The closure of prisons created a bottleneck in jails, jamming the
flow of residents in and out of county facilities. This resulted in serious
overcrowding, which was documented in several lawsuits brought on
behalf of jail population. In late April, the American Civil Liberties
95
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Union filed lawsuits against Gov. Newsom and Attorney General
Xavier Becerra, demanding that jail populations be reduced:
“Outbreaks at local jails and juvenile facilities threaten to tax the
broader community’s health care system beyond capacity. This
impending viral explosion — imminently likely to occur in most, if
not all, of California’s 58 counties — will directly impact all
California residents, including correctional staff, their families, and
their respective communities.”99
The situation in Orange County, described by Justice Sonia
Sotomayor in her dissent in Barnes v. Ahlman100—a class action suit
on behalf of the Orange County jail population—was emblematic of
these problems. Relying on “dozens of inmate declarations,” Justice
Sotomayor summarized the situation as follows:
Although the Jail had been warned that “social distancing is
the cornerstone of reducing transmission of COVID–19,”
inmates described being transported back and forth to the jail in
crammed buses, socializing in dayrooms with no space to distance
physically, lining up next to each other to wait for the phone,
sleeping in bunk beds two to three feet apart, and even being
ordered to stand closer than six feet apart when inmates tried to
socially distance. Moreover, although the Jail told its inmates that
they could “best protect” themselves by washing their hands with
“soap and water throughout the day,” numerous inmates reported
receiving just one small, hotel-sized bar of soap per week. And after
symptomatic inmates were removed from their units, other inmates
were ordered to dispose of their belongings without gloves or other
protective equipment. Finally, despite the Jail’s stated policy to test
and isolate individuals who reported or exhibited symptoms
consistent with COVID–19, multiple symptomatic detainees
described being denied tests, and others recounted sharing common
spaces with infected or symptomatic inmates.
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Two jail residents, José Armendariz and Lonnie Kocontes,
described the conditions in an interview with CalMatters.101 The two
said that they had witnessed jail staff fail to follow cleaning protocols,
particularly when distributing pills to residents from plastic pill bags
or handling inhalers. They reported that the staff frequently did not
wear masks, and that the masks for residents were made from torn-up
bedsheets that they were required to wrap around their faces. They also
reported that inmate workers use soiled rags to clean communal spaces
after mealtimes; according to Armendariz, residents are required to
buy their own rags to clean with from the jail’s commissary, and that
cleaning supplies are so diluted that they are almost
useless. Armendariz and Kocontes also described the residents’
response to the conditions: creating their own quarantine system:
New arrivals are told not to touch anything — newspapers,
communal surfaces, the phones attached to the wall — for 12 days
after they arrive in the medical unit. There is one phone
designated for new inmates.
“We don’t touch that one even if it’s open. You just line up
and wait for a different one,” Armendariz said.102
Similar problems were reported in a class action lawsuit on behalf
of the Tulare County jail population, filed in July 2020. The plaintiffs
accused the sheriff of failing to implement state-mandated health
protocols to protect their health; one of the attorneys, ACLU attorney
Kathleen Guneratne, reported that jail residents “described ‘alarming,’
‘cramped,’ and ‘restrictive’ conditions, including prolonged hours of
confinement, where inmates are stuck in their cells for more than 23
hours per day.” Jail residents reported that those who were sick were
being “neglected, denied medical attention, and ignored when they
101
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asked to be tested. Many were shuffled in and out of cells and around
the facility, potentially exposing others to infection.” 103
Some of the neglect stemmed from staff shortages, a chronic
problem plaguing both state prisons and county jails—particularly in
distant, rural locations.104 Other problems involved misallocation of
funds intended for COVID-19 care relief; the Orange County Sheriff’s
Department, which received $90 million in federal coronavirus
response money, spent the vast majority of the funds to pay for salaries
and benefits of existing jail staff.105 Yet more problems resulted from
the architecture of different jails. According to a class-action lawsuit
on behalf of the Los Angeles County Jails’ population, the prisoners
in the Los Angeles County jails are crowded into open dormitories and
two-person cells the size of parking spaces. They are sleeping inches
from one another and cannot practice social distancing. Officers don’t
always wear masks, and prisoners’ masks aren’t replaced regularly.106
The plight of one of the plaintiffs, Tereza Gomez, was told in an oped in the Los Angeles Times: Gomez learned she was pregnant shortly
after her arrest in August. After testing positive for COVID-19 in
October, she was moved to a small, windowless, dirty solitary
confinement cell and locked in for 23 hours a day — punitive
conditions the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has warned
will deter prisoners from reporting symptoms. A scheduled obstetric
wellness exam was canceled because of her COVID-19 status. And
her criminal case has come to a standstill; the courts have repeatedly
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canceled hearings due to COVID risks.107
Zero Bail as a Depressurizing Valve
Handling COVID-19 in cramped, inappropriate facilities, without
transfers to prisons, required another depressurizing valve—and the
answer came from the courts. On April 6th, the Judicial Council of
California moved to set a statewide emergency bail schedule
that reduced bail to $0 for most misdemeanor and some low-level
felony offenses, for 90 days, starting April 15.108 Because
approximately 75% of the jail population consists of pretrial detainees,
the emergency measure resulted in considerable population reduction.
As reported by the Prison Policy Initiative109 and elsewhere, by the
end of May, jail populations in Los Angeles110 and Sacramento
Counties111 had decreased by over 30%. Orange County’s jail
population dropped by almost 45% in the same period,112 while other
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counties—including San Diego,113 San Mateo,114 and Stanislaus115-also released hundreds of people held pretrial.
The results of the measure were mixed. Sheriff’s departments in
Alameda and Ventura counties reported that the reduced number of
residents was amenable to cohorting, which slowed the spread of the
pandemic116; nevertheless, outbreaks occurred at both locations,
including the death of six residents in total in Ventura117 and a serious
outbreak in Alameda County’s Santa Rita Jail.118 The Santa Rita
outbreak prompted the Alameda County Public Defender, Brendon
Woods, to call for the immediate release of more than 100 inmates
who have less than six months left to serve as an emergency measure;
District Attorney Nancy O’Malley declined, arguing that she could not
“jeopardize the safety of victims or the community.”119
In June, during the phased reopening of the state, the Judicial
Council voted to end the emergency zero bail measure, leaving it up
to the individual county courts “to continue to use the emergency
COVID-19 bail schedule where necessary to protect the health of the
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community, the courts, and the incarcerated.”120 Thirty-one counties
(collectively housing about 80% of California residents) elected to
keep the emergency bail schedule in place.121 The outcome, again,
reflected the atomized, jurisdictional nature of jail policies. A
population tracking tool created by the Vera Institute of Justice shows
wide variation in the population trends of various California
counties.122 The highest decreases are reported in Yuba (-48%),
Orange (-39%), Marin (-31%), Santa Clara (-29%) and San Francisco
(-26%) counties. Tehama County increased its jail population by 28%,
followed by Monterey (+7%) and Placer (+1%) counties. Notably—
again—the data evinces an agnotology problem: the tracking tool
reports populations for only 16 counties.
The Hydra Rears Its Ugly Heads: Litigation
As explained in the previous sections, Prof. Schlanger’s
prediction that healthcare litigation in the post-Plata era would take
the shape of the mythical hydra has come true. In California, and
nationwide, numerous lawsuits were filed on behalf of both prison and
jail populations—some as consolidated habeas corpus petitions, some
as class action lawsuits, and some, tragically, as wrongful death
grievances.
In a forthcoming article, Brandon Garrett and Lee Kovarski
analyzed hundreds of COVID-19 in correctional settings. They found
that judges tended to avoid constitutional holdings as much as
possible, rejected requests for ongoing supervision, and resisted mass
releases as a remedy, opting instead to limit such relief to vulnerable
subpopulations. They also found that moral worth and deservedness
played a role in litigant success: the most successful litigants were
detainees in custody pending immigration proceedings, and the least
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successful were those convicted of crimes.123
In Garrett and Kovarski’s typology, jail residents occupy an
interesting place. On one hand, they consist mostly of pretrial
detainees who, of course, are presumed innocent; on the other, they
sometimes require courts to pore into conditions in small facilities in
remote locations, which can be labor intensive if supervision is
necessary. In addition, the remedies sought in jail lawsuits run the
gamut between improved healthcare protocols (PPE supplies, social
distancing, mask mandates for staff) and population reduction orders.
Of particular interest was the federal litigation involving COVID19 protocols in the Orange County jail system. In late May, District
Court Judge Jesus G. Bernal ordered the sheriff to enforce social
distancing, administer regular testing, and distribute cleaning supplies
and hand sanitizers.124 The sheriff appealed the order all the way to the
Supreme Court which, in a 5-4, stayed the lower court’s preliminary
injunction.
The decision was brief, with only Justice Sotomayor writing in
dissent that the decision to stay the injunction was “extraordinary.”
Ordinarily, the conditions for granting a stay require (1) a “reasonable
probability” that SCOTUS will actually grant certiorari to hear the
case, (2) a “fair prospect” that SCOTUS will subsequently reverse the
decision on the merits, and (3) “a likelihood that irreparable harm
[will] result from the denial of a stay”. None of these applied in the
Orange County litigation: the Ninth Circuit ruled on clearly
established law–it found ample proof of “deliberate indifference”
because the jails were forewarned about this months ago and knew the
risks—and, even if the Eighth Amendment constituted insufficient
grounds for relief, there would be an alternative claim under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The odds that the Supreme Court
would grant certiorari and hear the case, therefore, were slim—and,
worst of all, the “likelihood of irreparable harm” was obvious from the
123
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facts, which are quoted in a previous subsection.
The extent (and expense) to which the sheriff, who according to
the claims in Ahlman, did not provide PPE to jail residents, went in
challenging the decision were remarkable, especially in light of the
fact that the remedy granted was not a mass release but merely a
mandate regarding health protocol. But the Orange County mess
would eventually result in a more dramatic remedy. Some jail
residents filed habeas corpus writs with the Orange County Superior
Court—which, on December 11, 2020, ordered the jail to reduce its
population by 50%.125
In his decision, Judge Peter Wilson recounted the facts, which
painted—as in Ahlman v. Barnes—a horrifying picture of the COVID
experience at the jail. Not only was it impossible, given the conditions
in the facility, for residents to socially distance, staff behavior was not
monitored when they were away from the facility. Amazingly, staff
were not tested unless they requested to be, even if they displayed
symptoms. The staff was provided PPE but were not required to wear
it. Housing decisions did not take medical vulnerability into account.
None of these facts, which were backed by statements from medical
experts and staff members, were contradicted by respondents with any
evidence.
The decision was a pretty straightforward application of an earlier
Court of Appeal decision in In re Von Staich, regarding the San
Quentin outbreak.126 In Von Staich, the court applied the procedural
standard from People v. Duvall127, according to which, on habeas
corpus, the respondent (in this case, the correctional facility) must
state facts in its return brief—and if it does not do so (for example, if
it merely denies the petitioner’s allegations) no evidentiary hearing is
granted. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal agreed with the expert
opinions and memos by medical experts, which estimated that proper
social distancing could only be achieved through a population
reduction, and found nothing in respondent’s briefs to contradict these
findings.
In Campbell, Judge Wilson found that the Orange County Sheriff
125
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took a page from the San Quentin Warden’s litigation strategy and
limited his response to denying the jail residents’ allegations. As a
consequence, Judge Wilson relied on the facts argued by the
petitioners to establish that an Eighth Amendment violation had
occurred—in other words, that the sheriff exhibited “deliberate
indifference” to the health and safety of the jail population.
Consequently, the court granted the specific petitioners in Campbell
immediate relief, in the form of release or transfer. For everyone else
in the Orange County Jail, the court modeled its order after the Von
Staich order, with some more specificity: it ordered population
reductions of at least 50% in all dormitories–and, if this were to be
insufficient to achieve proper distancing, even further reductions.
The District Attorney criticized the decision,128 arguing that the
population reduction order “will release dangerous and violent
criminals back into our neighborhoods to commit more crimes and
victimize more people.” The sheriff—only days after declaring that
his deputies would not enforce Gov. Newsom’s stay-at-home
order129—issued a statement: "We are evaluating the order, its impacts
and our options for appeal. . . If the order stands, it will result in the
release of more than 1,800 inmates."130
It will be interesting to see how the case fares at the appellate
level. Importantly, since the decision in Campbell, Von Staich was
reversed by the California Supreme Court131 and is now on its way
back to the Marin Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing on
whether the San Quentin authorities engaged in remedial measures
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sufficient to counter the court’s finding of deliberate indifference.132
This could provide the District Attorney and Sheriff Barnes legal
ammunition to force an evidentiary hearing, at which they could
present evidence of mitigation to try and counter the “deliberate
indifference” finding.
What can we learn from the Orange County litigation and other
jail cases? Encouragingly, the transience of jail populations has not
stood in the way of obtaining class certification for class action
lawsuits, or of obtaining excellent legal representation. In that respect,
civil rights litigators have adapted well to the post-Plata world. In
addition, the hesitance to grant population reduction orders, which is
part of the federal legal landscape after the enactment of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act,133 seems not to have spilled over to state
courts. The extent to which litigants will eventually prevail in
affirming these orders remains to be seen. Another lesson from the
similarities of Von Staich and Campbell is that, despite the
jurisdictional differences, some judges are able to see that similar
humanitarian problems plague both state and county facilities.
Conclusion: Vaccines and Beyond
The narrative so far demonstrates, I hope, the folly of approaching
county jails from a mechanistic, jurisdictional perspective. The
tendency to ignore and discount counties except when used to
depressurize state prisons has resulted in a “hydra problem” of
infections,
human
rights
violations,
haphazard
release
countermeasures, and a flurry of litigation with varying degrees of
success.
The same problems are evident not only in the disease, but in the
distribution of the prophylactic. The advent of the Pfizer and Moderna
vaccines opened a new avenue of advocacy on behalf of incarcerated
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populations.134 Given the prioritization of vaccinating people in
congregate housing settings, such as nursery homes, similar arguments
were made in the context of prisons. The same arguments can, and
should, be made on behalf of residents of county jails. In California,
the concerted effort of advocates and experts led to the classification
of people in prison as vaccine priorities, in Tier 1B; despite a
disappointing January retraction of this policy,135 as of February 23,
2021, 40 percent of the prison population has been vaccinated.136
Despite understandable concerns that incarcerated people might
harbor mistrust and suspicion of prison authorities, which would stand
in the way of administering the vaccine, the acceptance rate among
incarcerated people has been high; refusal rates have only been
problematic among the staff.137
It is here where, once again, the jurisdictional-mechanistic
approach to county jails works to the detriment not only of their
residents, but of all residents of the surrounding and neighboring
counties: Even before it was rescinded, the California state mandate
134
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extends only to state prisons. Counties were left to decide for
themselves whether to prioritize their jail populations and, as in other
matters, there has been considerable variation. Bay Area counties are
ramping up vaccination for their jail populations;138 Kings and Tulare
counties are vaccinating aging and infirm jail residents, while Merced
and Fresno Counties have no set date yet to begin vaccination in their
jails.139
While these variations in vaccine policies could be simply
manifestations of supply shortages, they might also represent political
pushback in the counties of the sort seen in other states regarding
prisons. In Colorado, for example, Governor Jared Polis responded to
public pressure by ignoring expert opinions on the urgency of
vaccinating incarcerated people for public health and downgraded this
population in his plan. The Director of the Center for Bioethics and
Humanities at the University of Colorado criticized this decision as
guided by “moralistic argument,” explaining that “[i]t’s a very
stigmatized population, and there are people who say, ‘They’re in
prison, they must have done something terrible, and they don’t deserve
a place in line.’”140
The prevalence of such “moralistic arguments,” which compound
public health priorities with hierarchies of perceived deservedness,
might play into the struggle for vaccination in jails. As explained
above, 75% of the California jail population consists of pretrial
detainees who, of course, are presumed innocent; it is not difficult to
imagine an appeal to public policy that distinguishes between these
people and the presumably “less deserving” people in state prisons.
Despite its superficial rhetorical appeal, I strongly advise against
relying on such an argument. Adopting the organic-geographical
perspective that this article proposes implies seeing all incarcerated
138
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people in California as part of one porous carceral network, along a
continuum that reaches to the outside community. The bottleneck
effects of the jurisdictional approach have led to outbreaks; the way
out of this quagmire requires accepting the need for population
equilibrium and population reductions throughout the entire
correctional system, regardless of administration and budgeting levels.
Part and parcel of this essential population reduction is opening the
jail floodgates, not only through releases to the population, but also as
a two-way flow to and from the prisons. Under such circumstances, it
is unacceptable to continue mixing vaccinated and unvaccinated
populations. Moreover, 25% of the jail population consists of
sentenced individuals, many of them for felonies; taking the
deservedness argument to its conclusion would lead to the absurd
policy of vaccinating only some jail residents and leaving others
exposed. Such a policy would be impossible to justify and would have
unbearable equity and public health implications.
Instead, I propose advocating the vaccination of the jail
population by relying on two arguments with organic-geographical
appeal. First, it must be clear that the transient jail population poses at
least as much risk to the surrounding community as the staff working
among the less transient prison population. The reasoning for
vaccination in both cases should be the same. In addition, there is a
practical consideration that should appeal to counties and
municipalities: running a vaccination enterprise at a congregate
housing location with permanent medical staff would ease vaccine
distribution, help with the dissemination of medical information,
protect county court personnel, and possibly have the ripple effect of
generating more vaccine acceptance among family members and
friends of people who are vaccinated during the course of their jail
residency.
While the project of vaccinating incarcerated populations is
worthwhile, it raises the concern that the vaccine would come to be
seen as the panacea for all correctional problems. This article’s review
of the spillover of healthcare problems from prisons into jails should
be a cautionary tale.
My recommendations for remedying the broken healthcare
structure in county jails require a paradigm change, which would view
jails not through the jurisdictional-mechanistic perspective, but as
organic parts of their surroundings and communities. Unifying the
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administration of prisons and jails in California might be a pipe dream;
however, at bare minimum, health care policies should be far better
coordinated. Informational databases—not only involving healthcare,
but also population shifts—should have seamless interfaces between
state and county facilities (an inexcusable oversight in a state with
such high technological literacy.) Aggressive efforts at hiring and
retaining medical staff should target not only individual facilities, but
also local county hospitals with an eye toward serving incarcerated
populations as well. Most importantly, health care policies, ranging
from preventative healthcare, nutrition and wellness, to emergency
care, should start with families and schools, extending into jails and
prisons as a continuum. These are crucial not only to curb the current
pandemic, but also to prevent the pandemics of the future.

